

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Cour Européenne
des Droits de l'Homme

05 MARS 2020


déposé à l'accueil

ENG - 2018/1

Application Form

About this application form

This form is a formal legal document and may affect your rights and obligations. Please follow the instructions given in the "Notes for filling in the application form". Make sure you fill in all the fields applicable to your situation and provide all relevant documents.



Warning: If your application is incomplete, it will not be accepted (see Rule 47 of the Rules of Court). Please note in particular that Rule 47 § 2 (a) requires that a concise statement of facts, complaints and information about compliance with the admissibility criteria MUST be on the relevant parts of the application form itself. The completed form should enable the Court to determine the nature and scope of the application without recourse to any other submissions.

Barcode label

If you have already received a sheet of barcode labels from the European Court of Human Rights, please place one barcode label in the box below.

Reference number

If you already have a reference number from the Court in relation to these complaints, please indicate it in the box below.

A. The applicant

A.1. Individual

This section refers to applicants who are individual persons only. If the applicant is an organisation, please go to section A.2.

1. Surname

2. First name(s)

3. Date of birth

3	1	2	1	2	1	9	6	0
D	D	M	M	Y	Y			

e.g. 31/12/1960

4. Place of birth

5. Nationality

6. Address

7. Telephone (including international dialling code)

8. Email (if any)

9. Sex

male female

A.2. Organisation

This section should only be filled in where the applicant is a company, NGO, association or other legal entity. In this case, please also fill in section D.1.

10. Name

11. Identification number (if any)

12. Date of registration or incorporation (if any)

2	7	0	9	2	0	1	2
D	D	M	M	Y	Y		

e.g. 27/09/2012

13. Activity

14. Registered address

15. Telephone (including international dialling code)

16. Email

Subject matter of the application

All the information concerning the facts, complaints and compliance with the requirements of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention must be set out in this part of the application form (sections E, F and G). It is not acceptable to leave these sections blank or simply to refer to attached sheets. See Rule 47 § 2 and the Practice Direction on the Institution of proceedings as well as the "Notes for filling in the application form".

E. Statement of the facts

58.

1. Aleksey Navalnyy (the first applicant) is a Russian opposition politician, political activist and blogger. He is the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (Фонд борьбы с коррупцией) ('FBK' – the second applicant), a non-profit organisation, established on 9 September 2011 employing 30 people, which investigates corruption in governmental bodies and publishes reports on large-scale embezzlement from the national budget (Annex 25 pp. 968-973). He was a candidate for the Moscow mayoral election in September 2013 (coming second and securing about 27% of the vote). He was prevented from standing in the Russian Presidential election in March 2018 because of a prior criminal conviction (in respect of which, the European Court concluded that he had been found guilty of acts which were indistinguishable from regular commercial activities – see para. 2).

2. Because of his political activism, Mr Navalnyy has been targeted by the Russian authorities since 2010 and he has been repeatedly prosecuted for a range of offences. He has successfully brought a series of cases to the European Court of Human Rights which has found multiple Convention violations, including Article 18 (Annex 25 p.978).

3. The third applicant, the Shtab Foundation for the Protection of Civil Rights ('the Shtab Foundation') is a non-profit organization which was set up on 24 May 2019 by Mr Navalnyy's supporters to combat corruption and implement his political projects. Its work is carried out by 171 freelance contractors. The fourth applicant, the Strana Prilivov Limited Liability Company ('Strana Prilivov, LLC') was established on 20 July 2017 by Mr Navalnyy's supporters to provide financial support for the work of the Shtab Foundation (Annex 2 pp. 69, 73). Its CEO and only employee is Evgeny Zamyatin (the seventh applicant), as its work is outsourced. In 2017-2018, Mr Navalnyy's supporters also established a regional network of offices in Russia ('Navalnyy's Headquarters'), to support his political initiatives and conduct anti-corruption investigations.

4. The fifth to eleventh applicants are active supporters of Aleksey Navalnyy, and/or employees or officers of the second, third and fourth applicant organisations (Annex 3, pp. 74-81). The fifth applicant, Vyacheslav Gimadi, is Head of the FBK Legal Department. The sixth applicant, Aleksandr Pomazuev, is a lawyer employed by FBK. The seventh applicant, Evgeny Zamyatin is the founder and director of Strana Prilivov, LLC. The eighth applicant, Leonid Volkov, is a member of the FBK Supervisory Board. The ninth applicant, Liliya Chanysheva is the founder and Director of the Shtab Foundation, as well as the head of the Navalnyy's Headquarters in Ufa (Republic of Bashkortostan). The tenth applicant, Sergey Boyko, is the head of the Navalnyy's Headquarters in Novosibirsk. The eleventh applicant, Olga Guseva, was the deputy director of Navalnyy's Headquarters in Saint Petersburg.

5. A number of the applicants have also themselves been active in recent elections. Mr Boyko stood as a candidate in the mayoral elections in Novosibirsk, on 8 September 2019, coming second in the polls. Ms Guseva coordinated the campaigns of candidates who supported Mr Navalnyy in municipal elections in St. Petersburg on 8 September 2019.

The criminal investigation into FBK, searches of the applicant organisations' offices and employees' homes, seizures of goods, freezing of bank accounts

6. On 15 July 2019, Police Captain E. A. Smaglo (from the Directorate for Economic Security and Combatting Corruption of the Senior Directorate of the Ministry of Interior) prepared 'Statement No. 129' (Annex 5, pp. 95-112) which alleged that the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants, and other named individuals, had received funds deposited into their personal accounts through ATMs, and that the monies had been obtained illegally.

7. On 27 July and 3 August 2019, mass demonstrations were held in Moscow (which included Aleksey Navalnyy's supporters) to protest against the barring of opposition candidates from participating in the elections to the Moscow City Duma in September 2019 (including Navalnyy supporters and FBK employees Lyubov Sobol and Ivan Zhdanov as well as a number of other independent candidates). On 24 July Mr Navalnyy was arrested and detained for 30 days in connection with the protests. (see Annex 24 pp. 529-546).

8. On 3 August 2019, the Investigator of the Main Investigations Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the city of Moscow ('the MIDIC') drew up a report about an alleged crime (Annex 5 pp. 113-114) which stated that, following an investigation, it had been established that

'...from 01.01.2016 to 31.12.2018, unidentified persons, including those who were employees of FBK, acting in conspiracy as a group of persons, received cash from unidentified third parties in the currency of the Russian Federation and in foreign currency in the total amount of at least RUB 75,585,300.21, which they knew to have been obtained illegally'.

Statement of the facts (continued)

59.

The MIDIC report stated that the unidentified persons (including FBK employees) had deposited the monies through ATMs into FBK accounts, in order to make them appear legal. The total figure in the MIDIC report (RUB 75,585,300.21 (the equivalent of about €1,063,692.7)) is the same as the total amount specified in statement No. 129 (referred to in para. 6 above). The report did not include any information about the alleged criminal origin of the funds specified in statement No. 129.

9. Also on 3 August 2019, the MIDIC Investigator issued an Order on the initiation of criminal case No. 11902450048000049 ('the FBK case') and its proceedings (Annex 5 pp. 115-116). On 5 August 2019, the MIDIC Investigator issued an Assignment on separate investigative proceedings (Annex 5 p. 117) which assigned particular MIA Divisions to identify the actual functions of the FBK employees, their places of residence, sources of income, safety deposit boxes, bank accounts, and property which could be seized.

10. On 6 August 2019, the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia reassigned the FBK case from the investigating authority of Moscow to the Senior Major Case Investigator under the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (Annex 6 p. 125). Thus, the case was transferred to investigators who are directly subordinate to the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia, who is appointed and dismissed by the President of Russia. No reasons were given for this decision.

11. Also on 6 August 2019, in accordance with a decision of the Presenskiy District Court of Moscow the funds in the FBK organisational bank account (No. 40703810402710000002) held with the Alfa-bank, were frozen until 3 October 2019, according to Articles 115 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Annex 7 pp. 153-154). This decision was upheld by the Moscow Criminal Court of Appeal on 11 September 2019. This made it impossible for FBK to pay salaries to its employees or to pay its contractors, and it paralyzed the organization's regular business activities.

12. After the FBK account was frozen on 6 August, funds from a foreign person were transferred to it. Since the accounts were seized, the FBK was not aware that they had been received, and could not dispose of them (see statement of Mr Navalnyy and article in Meduza 18 October 2019, (Annex 24 pp. 734-737).

13. On 7 August 2019, the Investigative Committee of Russia issued a press release (Annex 6 pp. 123-124), in which it ranked the FBK case equally with the investigation of the criminal case relating to the 'mass riots' which was opened immediately after the peaceful protests in Moscow in July and August (see para. 7).

14. On 8 August 2019, the first of a series of searches was carried out at the FBK premises on Leninsky Sloboda st. 19, Moscow, by investigators accompanied by a number of police officers, some heavily armed, during which 170 items of property and documents were seized, including video cameras, employees' public travel cards, FBK accounting documents and seals, and other documents relating to FBK employees.

15. Also on 8 August 2019, the homes of employees and contractors of FBK and the Shtab Foundation in Moscow were searched: Vyacheslav Gimadi (the fifth applicant), Head of the FBK Legal Department, as well as FBK lawyers Aleksandr Pomazuev (the sixth applicant), Evgeny Zamyatin (the seventh applicant), Vladlen Los, Video Editor Vitaly Kolesnikov and of the Shtab Foundation Anastasia Kadetova (Manager). Mr Pomazuev was pushed to the floor and hit in his face during the search, although he did not resist in any way. Mobile phones, computers, and storage media (flash drives, hard drives) were seized from all those searched. The sum of RUB 2.3 million was taken from Mr Kolesnikov, which he had received after selling his apartment (of which he had documentary proof). The searches at the homes of Mr Pomazuev, Mr Kolesnikov and Ms Kadetova were conducted without their lawyers being present (even though each had requested the presence of their lawyer). After the searches, each of the individuals were interrogated by investigators from the Investigative Committee of Russia.

16. Furthermore, from 6-8 August 2019 these applicants' bank accounts were frozen, as were accounts with Alfa-Bank, Avangard, and Sberbank belonging to the eighth applicant, Leonid Volkov, his wife, Anna Biryukova, lawyers Vyacheslav Gimadi, Aleksandr Pomazuev, Evgeny Zamyatin, Roman Rubanov, the former Director of FBK, Ruslan Shaveddinov, and Anna Chekhovich, managers at the Shtab Foundation, (Annexes 8-11 pp. 167-294).

17. On 13 August 2019, in relation to the FBK case, an investigative group consisting of 21 Major Case Investigators was formed. This group was expanded to 112 Major Case Investigators on 3 September, and later to 141 (Annex 6 pp. 132-149).

18. On 19 August 2019, the period for which the bank accounts of the FBK, and of the applicants Leonid Volkov, Aleksandr Pomazuev, Vyacheslav Gimadi and Evgeny Zamyatin were frozen was extended until 3 February 2020, by a decision of the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow, in line with the extended period of the investigation. This was done without informing the applicants and in violation of their right to participate in the court session. (Annex 12 pp. 300-304).

Statement of the facts (continued)

- 60.
19. In order to continue to be able to operate after the freezing of their accounts on 6 and 19 August 2019, FBK opened a new bank account, with Alfa-Bank bank. Donations from individual Russian citizens to finance FBK's work were deposited into this account, and the funds were used by FBK to pay salaries and contractors (fully in compliance with the domestic law).
20. On 28 August 2019, the funds, equivalent to RUB 75,585,300.21 were frozen in the FBK's new bank account until 3 February 2020 according to a decision of the Basmani District Court of Moscow (Annex 13 pp. 319-322). Those accounts did not contain any funds received in the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018 which period was the subject of the criminal case.
21. On 3 September 2019, the Vice-Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia issued an order to conduct preliminary investigative proceedings (Annex 6 pp. 135-143). A separate order on conducting searches, interrogations and freezing of bank accounts, issued on the same date by R.R. Gabdulin, the Senior Investigator of the Major Crime Unit of the Investigative Committee of Russia, stated that the criminal proceedings were under the personal control of the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia. The order also stated that copies of the procedural documents were not to be made, unless they were required under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and no parties, except for the investigators working on the case, were to have access to the order itself.
22. From 2 September to 5 September 2019, 100 bank accounts of employees of the Navalny's Headquarters in 31 regions of Russia were frozen (Annex 14 pp. 362-369). On 4 September 2019, two bank accounts with Sberbank of the eleventh applicant, Olga Guseva, were frozen by the decision of the Basmani District Court of Moscow until 3 February 2020 (Annex 20 pp. 451-455). On 11 September 2019, the bank accounts of Strana Prilivov, LLC were frozen (Annex 15 pp. 385-388).
23. On 12 September 2019, 145 searches (in 41 regions of Russia) were conducted by investigators and police officers (some of whom were armed) at the homes of employees of the Navalny's Headquarters, as well as their relatives and other acquaintances (Annex 14 pp. 370-381). These included searches at the homes of Liliya Chanyшева (the ninth applicant), Sergey Boyko (the tenth applicant) and Olga Guseva (the eleventh applicant) (Annex 16-18). Also on 12 September, a search was conducted at the warehouse rented by Strana Prilivov LLC (Moscow, 2nd Mashinosroeniya St. 23, rooms B2.43 and D1.20b, B2.41) (Annex 19). During the search, the items seized included a map of Russia, new computer monitors in their original packaging, bracelets with the inscription "Navalny 2018!" and other products intended for sale online.
24. On 20 September 2019, new FBK account in Alfa-Bank bank was frozen (account opened after the previous block on 28 August). Those accounts did not contain any funds received in the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018 which period was the subject of the criminal case (Annex 13 pp. 339-342).
25. On 27 September 2019, the account of the Shtab Foundation was frozen. These account had been opened after the period covered by the FBK case (1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018), as the Shtab Foundation was not established until May 2019 and had never received any funds from FBK or transferred any funds to FBK (Annex 21 pp. 469-472).
26. From 15 to 17 October 2019, a further 45 searches (in 20 regions of Russia) were conducted at the homes of employees of the Navalny's Headquarters, and those of their relatives and acquaintances (Appendix 22 pp. 500-503). Also on 15 October, a search was conducted at premises on Leninsky Sloboda st. 19, Moscow rented by Shtab Foundation (information about renting that premise by FBK is a mistake) which was used for the production of videos (Annex 21 pp. 485-493). During the search, various property was seized, including expensive video editing equipment, video cameras, lighting devices, tripods and metal racks. Such items seized were obviously not relevant to the case.
27. On 17 October 2019, 72 bank accounts of contractors of the Shtab Foundation were frozen (Appendix 22 pp. 494-499).
28. On 26 December 2019, FBK's office was broken into and searched by investigators and armed police using power tools while employees were inside. FBK's new bank account (opened after the account was frozen on 20 September 2019) was also actually frozen (a court order for this was issued on December 24, 2019) (Appendix 13 pp. 359-361).
29. On 2 March 2020 the authorities froze the personal accounts of Mr Navalny; his parents, Navalny Anatoly Ivanovich and Navalnaya Lyudmila Ivanovna; his wife, Navalnaya Julia Borisovna; his son, Navalny Zakhar Alekseevich; and his daughter, Navalnaya Daria Alekseevna (Annex 24 p. 542).

Classification of FBK as a 'foreign agent'

30. On 9 October 2019, FBK was classified by the Ministry of Justice as a 'non-profit organization performing functions of a foreign agent' under the Federal Law 'On Non-Profit Organisations'.
31. This classification as a 'foreign agent' has imposed on FBK substantial additional duties and limitations, further obstructing its activities (see Supplementary Information on Annex 1 and Annex 23 p. 504).

F. Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments

61. Article invoked	Explanation
Articles 11 (freedom of association) and 10 (freedom of expression) – taken alone and together with Article 18 (restrictions on rights)	<p>The applicants submit that the authorities' actions have violated their rights under Art. 11 and Art. 10, taken alone and in conjunction with Art. 18.</p> <p>The applicants' rights have been breached as a result of the criminal investigation instigated against the FBK (2nd applicant) into purported money laundering, and the searches of the offices of the applicant organisations and homes of the individual applicants, seizure of property and the freezing of the bank accounts of the applicant organisations and individuals (and others associated with them) under the investigation. These measures were not sufficiently justified or evidenced and therefore not well-grounded, as required by the relevant domestic law (Arts. 115, 165, 182 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The extensive, coercive measures undertaken went beyond the substantive and temporal remit of the investigation: the Shtab Foundation (3rd applicant) was not established until after the stated end of the investigation period and many of the items seized in searches (including lighting and video equipment) had no relevance to the investigation. Since August 2019, the authorities have undertaken 191 searches across 41 regions of Russia and arrested 173 bank accounts, including of volunteers and supporters associated with the applicants, as well as their relatives, neighbours and other acquaintances with no connection to the investigation.</p> <p>This systematic campaign of intimidation and harassment has seriously obstructed the work of the applicant organisations, and prevented the applicant organisations and individuals from exercising their rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression. The measures taken by the authorities were not prescribed by law, did not pursue any legitimate aims and were not necessary or proportionate in a democratic society, under Arts. 11 and 10. Additionally, the classification of the FBK as a 'foreign agent' is in breach of Arts. 11 and 10, alone and in conjunction with Art. 18 (See <i>Ecodefence and Others v Russia</i> and 48 other applications (No. 9988/13)).</p> <p>There has also been a violation of Art. 18, taken together with Arts. 11 and 10, because the authorities' intention (their only or predominant purpose) is to curtail the applicants' political work. They have pursued an ulterior purpose within the meaning of Art. 18, to suppress democratic accountability and political pluralism. This is a fundamental aspect of this case, which is not adequately addressed by Arts. 11 or 10, or the other Convention provisions relied on (<i>Merabishvili v Georgia</i> [GC] No. 72508/13). The widely and internationally acknowledged context of repression of civil society and political opposition in Russia is central to the applicants' submissions. Furthermore, the Court is aware of the specific persecution of Mr Navalnyy (1st applicant) as an opposition politician and anti-corruption campaigner, and has held that the Government has pursued manifestly unreasonable and/or politically motivated proceedings against him (see <i>Navalnyy and Yashin</i>; <i>Navalnyy and Ofitserov</i>; <i>Navalnyy v Russia</i> (Nos. 1 and 2) and <i>Navalnyye v Russia</i>).</p> <p>Mr Navalnyy, as a leading opposition politician and founder of FBK, is the fulcrum and principal target of the authorities in this case. Their aim is to prevent him from mounting an effective political opposition to the Russian government, and from publishing information about corruption, damaging to those currently in power. This work is led by Mr Navalnyy and carried out through the FBK, the Shtab Foundation and the regional Navalnyy Headquarters, and supported by Strana Prilivov, LLC (4th applicant). The work is also supported by the 5th to 11th applicants, as employees or officers of the applicant organisations. The authorities have sought to paralyse the organizational structures which are affiliated with, or connected to, the political work carried out by Mr Navalnyy and his associates and to intimidate his employees and supporters. In particular the applicants submit:</p> <p>a) No evidence of the constituent elements of the crime investigated (conspiracy; illegality of the original funds; identity of the suppliers; knowledge of illegality by the applicants or any others subject to these measures; the 'laundering' of the money by transfer to FBK accounts) has been provided by investigators or relied on by the courts to authorise invasive procedural measures. The requests by investigators and decisions issued by the courts are formulaic. The courts have provided no meaningful judicial</p>

Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments (continued)

62. Article invoked	<p>Explanation oversight or scrutiny.</p> <p>b) The timing of the investigation (and coercive measures) coincides with various political actions of the applicants, including legal support for candidates in the Moscow City Duma elections in July/August 2019, the registration of whom was refused, causing large-scale protests and the launch of the 'Smart Voting' project which strategically directs voters to the strongest opposition candidate in their constituency.</p> <p>c) The scale, impact and significance attributed to the investigation are indicative of the authorities' ulterior intention. More than six months into the investigation, there are no named suspects or accused (arguably deliberately facilitating its on-going extensive and obstructive remit).</p> <p>d) Almost immediately the case was assigned to the Senior Major Case Investigator under the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia, who is appointed and dismissed by the President of Russia, confirming its unusually high level of perceived significance for the authorities, and not justified by the complexity of the case, the sums involved, nor the nature of the not-for-profit organisations concerned.</p> <p>e) An unprecedentedly large investigation team was formed to conduct the investigation, including 141 Major Case Investigators of the Investigative Committee.</p> <p>f) The abusive conduct of the searches, including of people with no connection to the investigation, by numerous usually armed police officers, using heavy equipment such as angle grinders to break down doors, often in balaclavas, turning off surveillance cameras, and removing expensive items unrelated to the investigation, belies any pretensions of legality and demonstrates the intention to obstruct, intimidate and warn off persons connected in any way with Mr. Navalnyy, however remotely.</p> <p>g) Finally, i) the fact that there is no limit to the number of times the investigation can be extended and ii) that the offence of money laundering under Article 174(4) is punishable by compulsory labour of up to 5 years, or deprivation of liberty for up to 7 years, with a fine of up to 1 million Rubles, represent a considerable chilling effect on the applicants and the large number of persons deemed to fall within the investigation</p>
Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights)	<p>In the alternative to the applicants' submissions under Art. 18, the authorities' actions in this case (taken together) amount to an abuse of rights in violation of Art. 17, together with Arts. 11 and 10 (relying on the joint separate opinion of Judges Pejchal, Dedov, Ravarani, Eicke and Paczolay in <i>Navalnyy v. Russia</i> (No. 29580/12, 2018). The circumstances of this case go well beyond individual restrictions on rights, and concern an abusive system over a period of time and transpiring through an intensity of restrictions (separate opinion, para. 18). Furthermore, the authorities' concerted actions in this case 'are evidence or isolated manifestations of a system that abusively seeks to limit, by legislative, administrative and/or judicial means, the democratic rights of the applicant[s] in a way that substantially runs counter to the purpose and general spirit of the Convention and is aimed at unduly limiting those rights' (para. 33).</p>
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life and home)	<p>The searches and seizures carried out at the premises of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th applicants and homes of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th and 11th applicants, constitute an interference with their private and professional lives that was not prescribed by law, did not pursue any legitimate aims and was not necessary or proportionate, within the meaning of Art. 8. They were carried out unlawfully in various respects and/or went beyond the scope of the criminal investigation (see above).</p>
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions)	<p>The applicants were deprived of the right to access, control, use and dispose of their property as seized during the searches (above) and arrested in their bank accounts (1st, 2nd-8th and 11th applicants) in violation of their rights under Art. 1 of Protocol 1. These measures were not lawful, did not pursue any legitimate aims and were not proportionate (see above). As a result, the applicants have been denied access to, control over, or use of, their property for a period only limited by the 10yr statute of limitations regarding criminal prosecutions, pursuant to Articles 15 and 78 of the Criminal Code.</p>
Article 13 (right to an effective remedy)	<p>As regards the violations of the applicants' rights under Arts. 11 and 10, 8 and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, there is no effective domestic remedy, in breach of Art. 13.</p>

G. Compliance with admisibility criteria laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention

For each complaint, please confirm that you have used the available effective remedies in the country concerned, including appeals, and also indicate the date when the final decision at domestic level was delivered and received, to show that you have complied with the six-month time-limit.

63. Complaint	Information about remedies used and the date of the final decision
Articles 11 (freedom of association) and 10 (freedom of expression) – taken alone and together with Article 18 (restrictions on rights)	1. The applicants have set out further specific details of their exhaustion of domestic remedies in Annex 25. They submit that they have exhausted all available domestic remedies.
Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights)	2. The first applicant, Alexei Navalnyy, has pursued remedies as relevant through FBK, the second applicant, and has no other available remedies to exhaust. He has not yet been able to challenge the arrest of his bank account on 2 March 2020 (see <i>Ozturk v Turkey</i> , No. 29365/95 Admissibility Decision 27.5.03).
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life and home)	3. The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and eleventh applicants have challenged the freezing of their bank accounts before the Moscow City Court. All the complaints were rejected on dates between 9 September 2019 and 27 February 2020 (Annexes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20).
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions)	
Article 13 (right to an effective remedy)	4. The second, third and fourth applicants have lodged complaints against the searches of their premises, that are currently pending before the Moscow City Court.
	5. The fifth, sixth and seventh applicants have challenged the searches of their homes and these complaints are currently pending before the Moscow City Court.
	6. The ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants challenged the search of their homes before the Basmany District court and on appeal before the Moscow City Court and their complaints were rejected on various dates in November and December 2019 (Annexes 16, 17, 18).
	7. The second applicant challenged its registration as a 'Foreign Agent' which was re-affirmed by an Order of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation of 9 October 2019 and has been rejected by the Zamoskvoretsky District Court of 1 November 2019 and the appeal decision of the Moscow City Court of 20 January 2020 and is pending before the Court of Cassation.
	8. There is no further effective appeal of these decisions under domestic law. This Court has held that the procedure of supervisory review under Section XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation does not constitute a remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 of the Convention (<i>Orlovskaya Iskra v Russia</i> , No. 42911/08, 21 February 2017, at 66 and 68; <i>Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 2)</i> , 43734/14, 9 September 2019, at 41).

I. List of accompanying documents

You should enclose full and legible copies of all documents. No documents will be returned to you. It is thus in your interests to submit copies, not originals. You MUST:

- arrange the documents in order by date and by procedure;
- number the pages consecutively; and
- NOT staple, bind or tape the documents.

70. In the box below, please list the documents in chronological order with a concise description. Indicate the page number at which each document may be found

1.	Supplementary Information to the Application	p.	1-20
2.	Documents describing the goals and objectives of the Applicant Organizations, confirming the management authority	p.	21-73
3.	Documents confirming the work of the Applicant individuals for the Applicant organizations or cooperation with them	p.	74-81
4.	Documents confirming the financing of Navalnyy's Headquarters by Shtab Foundation	p.	82-94
5.	Documents that form the basis of the criminal case	p.	95-122
6.	Documents of investigation of criminal case No. 11902450048000049 at the highest level of investigating authorities by the investigative team	p.	123-149
7.	Documents on the freezing of the FBK account dated 06.08.2019	p.	150-166
8.	Documents on the freezing of the accounts of L.M. Volkov dated 06.08.2019	p.	167-203
9.	Documents on the freezing of the accounts of Pomazuev dated 06.08.2019	p.	204-218
10.	Documents on the freezing of the accounts of Gimadi dated 06.08.2019	p.	219-234
11.	Documents on the freezing of the accounts of Zamyatin dated 06.08.2019	p.	235-294
12.	Documents on the freezing of the accounts of applicants dated 19.08.2019	p.	295-315
13.	Documents on the re-freezing of the applicants' accounts dated 28.08.2019, 20.09.2019 and 24.12.2019	p.	316-361
14.	Information about the searches and freezing of accounts of the Shtab Foundation contractors during the period from September 2, 2019 to September 12, 2019	p.	362-381
15.	Documents on the freezing of the account of Strana Prilivov, LLC	p.	382-400
16.	Documents on the search in Sergey Boyko's Apartment	p.	401-412
17.	Documents on the search in Liliya Chanysheva's Apartment	p.	413-424
18.	Documents on the search in Olga Guseva's Apartment	p.	425-436
19.	Documents on the search in warehouses of Strana Prilivov, LLC	p.	437-447
20.	Documents on the freezing of the accounts of Olga Guseva	p.	448-465
21.	Documents on the freezing of the account of Shtab Foundation and search of its premise	p.	466-493
22.	Information about the searches and freezing of accounts of the Shtab Foundation contractors during the period from October 15, 2019 to October 17, 2019	p.	494-503
23.	Documents on classifying FBK as a foreign agent	p.	504-528
24.	Witness statements of applicants	p.	529-965
25.	Additional documents: 1) Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies; 2) A list of the main FBK investigations; 3) List of publications in media; 4) Submission for category I hour; 5) List of Navalnyy; 6) Flash drive applicants spreadsheet	p.	966-979

Any other comments

Do you have any other comments about your application?

71. Comments

Four horizontal lines for writing comments.

Declaration and signature

I hereby declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information I have given in the present application form is correct.


72. Date

0 3 0 3 2 0 2 0
D D M M Y Y Y Y

e.g. 27/09/2015

The applicant(s) or the applicant's representative(s) must sign in the box below.

73. Signature(s) Applicant(s) Representative(s) - tick as appropriate

 Замятин Е. М.

Confirmation of correspondent


If there is more than one applicant or more than one representative, please give the name and address of the one person with whom the Court will correspond. Where the applicant is represented, the Court will correspond only with the representative (lawyer or non-lawyer).

74. Name and address of Applicant Representative - tick as appropriate

Zamyatin Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich
Russia, 115409, Moscow, Kashirskoe highway, 78/3 - 161

The completed application form should be signed and sent by post to:

The Registrar
European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe
67075 STRASBOURG CEDEX
FRANCE



893669e1-66ca-4653-b9e0-2de2561a694b

Any other comments

Do you have any other comments about your application?

71. Comments

Declaration and signature


I hereby declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information I have given in the present application form is correct.

72. Date

0	3	0	3	2	0	2	0	e.g. 27/09/2015
D	D	M	M	Y	Y	Y	Y	

The applicant(s) or the applicant's representative(s) must sign in the box below.

73. Signature(s) Applicant(s) Representative(s) - tick as appropriate



Confirmation of correspondent

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74. Name and address of Applicant Representative - tick as appropriate

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